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NOTES
Elimination of Accrued Dividends in Corporate Reconstruction
Within recent years there have been frequent corporate attempts to
alleviate the situation resulting from burdens due to arrearages in accrued
dividends. These attempts have usually taken the form of reorganization 1
I. This type of reorganization or recapitalization is to be distinguished from the
adjustment of creditors' rights by reorganization. If the corporation is subject to the
Public Utility Holding Company Act, recapitalization must be approved by the SEC.
Such approval is contingent on a finding that the plan is not detrimental to the inter-
ests of the investors. See Note, The Rights of Cumulative Preferred Stockholders
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act (1939) 52 HARV. L. Rzv. i33 .
(789)
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plans whose purpose is to rearrange the capital structure by scaling down
the arrearages, and then to use any resulting surplus or new funds obtained
by issuing new securities, as working capital. And it is possible that the
prospect of new business opportunities, due to war orders and improved
business conditions with the consequent need for increased output facilities,
may well be a motivating factor in the attempt to free present assets from
dividend charges and to encourage the investment of new capital. Hence
it is likely that this problem will assume an aspect of increasing juridical
importance in the near future.
When a corporation, though not insolvent, wishes to effect a reorgan-
ization at the end of a long depression, it may find itself faced with a stag-
gering dividend burden because net earnings have not been sufficient to
meet the dividends which have been accruing on the cumulative preferred
shares. Usually, in form at least, the obligation is to pay cash. On the
one hand is the desire of the management and the common shareholders
to keep the corporation afloat and to improve its status as a going concern,
plus the knowledge of the common that any prospects of immediate divi-
dends for them from the profits of expected new business will be greatly
enhanced by the total or substantial elimination of the arrearages on the
preferred. But on the other hand, the preferred shareholders by their con-
tract with the corporation and the common have bargained for certainty in
income and a preferred position over the common. Unless some adjustment
satisfactory to the preferred holders can be made. any attempt to cancel or
defer such dividends, whether the motive be good or bad, will often be
resisted by dissenting holders of preferred who insist that any plan depriv-
ing them of their right to accrued unpaid dividends is an impairment of
their contract 2 with the corporation and the other shareholders, and that
their right to such dividends is "vested" 3 and hence cannot be destroyed
without violating the Constitution.
4
Even where such shareholders have the alternative remedy of having
their shares and dividends appraised I and turned into cash, the objection is
put forth that such a remedy is not exclusive 6 and is for the benefit of the
2. Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, 197 Atl. 489 (Del. Sup. CL 1937);
Keller v. Wilson, 29o Atl. 115 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. In-
ternational Mercantile Marine Corp., ioi N. J. Eq. 554, 139 Atl. 5o (1927) ; Robert v.
Roberts-Wick Co., 184 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (m9o6) ; cf. Allen v. White, 103 Neb.2,56, 171 N. W. s2 (1919).
3. See cases in note 2 supra. Courts have been prone to assume the result by
calling these rights vested. See Note (937) 4 U. oF CHI. L. REV. 645, 647. The
theory of these cases is that a holder of preferred shares upon which there are past due
and accrued dividends has a vested right in the surplus and earnings of the corporation
until such dividends are paid.
4. See cases in note 2 supra. Cf. Superior Water, Light & Power Co. v. City of
Superior, 263 U. S. 125, 137 (923). See also 7 FLETcHER, PRIVATE CORPOIL.TIONS
(Perm. ed. 293i) §365&
S. Such a remedy is infrequent where the plan of elimination used is the forced or
direct method by charter amendment, because this method in almost all cases in the
past has been held to be illegal. Nor is it prevalent in the optional or indirect method
of deferring the dividends by charter amendment. Ohio, however, does have a statutory
provision for appraisal in both situations. See OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's
Baldwin, i94o) §§ 8623-14, 25 and 72. See note 8 infra.
6. This argument was rejected in a merger case. Havender v. Federal United
Corp., ii A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940), but upheld in Albrecht, Maguire & Co.
v. General Plastics, 28o N. Y. 84o, 21 N. E. (2d) 887 (1939), where a divestiture of a
pre-emptive right was enjoined. In Ohio, appraisal has been held exclusive in the
absence of illegality or fraud, in both forced or optional plans of reorganization. John-
son v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, I5 N. E. (2d) 127 (2938) (optional) ; Vulcan
Corp. v. Westheimer & Co., 27 Ohio Law Abstract 694 (Ohio App. 4th, 2938), appeal
dismissed 135 Ohio St. 136 (1939) (no debatable constitutional question involved).
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shareholder so the corporation cannot force them to utilize it. Even where
appraisal is held exclusive or the dissenters agree on it as a remedy, the
plan may have to be abandoned because any new capital from the sale of
new issues, usually part of the plan, or surplus resulting from recapitaliza-
tion will have to be paid out again and there will be much less chance for
immediate dividend payments to the holders of what were to be new attrac-
tive shares. But appraisal is not available in every case,7 and unless the
corporation can pay off the dissenters in full, direct elimination of arrear-
ages will be impossible. When the proposed plan is optional, 8 the old pre-
ferred may have to accept an inferior position, since such a plan often
includes the issuance of one or two new classes of prior preferred to encour-
age investors with the prospects of early dividend payments. From the
standpoint of the dissenters, whether the plan is forced or optional, neither
the appraisal remedy 9 nor the relegation to a lower position is an adequate
substitute. In the latter case, where the attempt is to subordinate not only
the dividends to accrue subsequently on the old preferred but also the pres-
ent unpaid accumulations, there does not seem to be much hope that the
arrearages will ever be paid even though theoretically they are not cancelled.
However, from the broader viewpoint of a desirable expansion of
business activity and the attendant benefits which accrue to the public, plus
the public interest in continuing these business associations as going con-
cerns, some solution to the dilemma is desirable and imperative. Funda-
mentally, a balance of conveniences is involved, with individual contract
rights on one side and public and economic needs on the other. When such
is the case, the scales usually settle in favor of the public need, and this
trend has become more marked of late. It is significant that two states
have legalized the elimination of unpaid accrued dividends by statute,10
where a large proportion of the affected shares vote in favor of the plan.
The purpose of this note is to ascertain how the courts are meeting the
situation when confronted by the various plans, and .what may be expected
in the future in the light of some recent decisions which definitely point to
a change in the law underlying the problem.
7. Appraisal provisions are usually present in merger or consolidation, but not
where dividend rights are altered by charter amendment. See note 5 supra. Cf.
Johnson v. De Soto Hardwood Flooring Co., 167 Tenn. 145, 67 S. W. (2d) x43 (1934).
8. The optional or indirect method by charter amendment is to create a new class
of preferred shares prior to the old preferred both as to accumulations and future divi-
dends. The new shares are offered in exchange for the old and their accrued dividends.
Some junior stock may be thrown in for good measure. The old preferred sharehold-
ers have the option of keeping their shares or accepting the exchange, but if they do
not exchange, they are subordinate to the new preferred. For example, see Shanik v.
White Sewing Machine Corp., IS A. (2d) 169 (Del. Ch. i94o). In the forced or direct
method of cancelling arrearages by charter amendment, the preferred shareholder must
either agree to the plan or sell his shares on the market unless he is successful in en-
joining the amendment or voiding it. For example, see Keller v. Wilson, 190 Ati. 115
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1936).
9. Such statutes normally provide that the dissenters are entitled to the "value" of
their shares. In most cases this turns out to be less than the par value of the shares
plus arrearages. It has been said that these statutes are inadequate because the share-
holder does not recover the investment value of his securities, past and future. Lattin,
Remedies of Dissenting Stockholders under Appraisal Statutes (1931) 45 Haav. L
REv. 233.
10. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin. 194o) §§ 8623-14, 1S. A two-
thirds vote of classes affected is required to adopt the plan, and dissenters may have
their shares and accrued dividends appraised under § 8623-72. See also the language in
Harvey v. National Drug Co., 30 D. & C. 318 (Pa. 1937). In VA. CoDE ANN. (Cum.
Supp. 1940) § 3780 a go% vote is required, but their does not appear to be any appraisal
remedy.
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM AND THE CONTRACTS INVOLVED
At the outset it may be pointed out that there are two contracts in-
volved in any case involving cancellation or scaling down of accrued unpaid
dividends. The primary contract is the corporate charter granted by the
state, a contract between the state and the corporation. The secondary con-
tract is that between the corporation and the shareholders, embodied in the
articles of incorporation or association and in the share certificates. This
contract also defines the rights of the shareholders inter sese. Theoretically,
the state creating a private corporation should have absolute control over
its offspring. But at an early date it was decided in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward "I that the legislative power in this respect is subject
to the limitations of the Constitution, since the charter of a corporation is
a contract with the state, which contract can not be repealed or altered
by subsequent legislative action. Rights legally vested in a corporation
cannot be controlled or destroyed by any subsequent statute unless a power
to that effect was reserved 12 by the state, though in the absence of any
reserved power there still remained some power of regulation based on the
police power, 3 which a state by granting a charter could not bargain away.
Most of the states at once adopted Justice Story's suggestion in the Dart-
inouth College case, and by statute or constitutional amendment, reserved
to themselves the power to alter, amend or repeal corporate charters; cor-
porations existing before such enactments have been brought within their
scope by the acceptance '1 of these provisions, either expressly or impliedly.
As a result, the existence of the reserved power to alter, amend or repeal is
practically universal.
Since all corporations today operate subject to this power, theoretically
it would seem that all rights acquired by the corporation or its shareholders
should be contingent on exercise of this power in any direction. But prac-
cally this is far from true. and the exercise of this power is not without
limit.' 5 It may be that the courts feel that this general power is too latent
and remote from the secondary contract to be allowed to affect rights gained
thereunder by the shareholders. At any rate, it seems that until the state
exercises its general power and passes a specific statute dealing with share-
holders' rights, such rights will not take on a defeasible nature. These may
be (i) pre-emptive rights, (2) redemption rights, (3) conversion rights,
(0" voting rights, (5) freedom from assessments, (6) preferential rights
in dissolution, (7) preferential rights as to dividends, and a host of others.
These contract rights accrue to the person as soon as he becomes a share-
holder and apparently the,% should be "indefeasible" or "vested" at once,
subject to any specific reservation in state laws or articles which expressly
make them defeasible. In the absence of any such reservation, it would
seem that any change in the articles affecting any of the rights, whether
H. 4 Wheat. S18 (U. S. 1819).
12. This suggestion was made in the Dartmouth College case by Justice Story at
p. 674.
13. People v. Logan County B. & L. Ass'n, 369 Ill. 518, 17 N. E. (2d) 4 (1938);
Venner v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 246 I1. 170, 92 N. E. 643 (9T).
14. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. State, 154 Ala. 156, 45 So. 296 (19o7).
15. Winfree v. Riverside Cotton 'Mills, r13 Va. 717, 75 S.* E. 309 (1912). The
extent of this power is not fully settled, but it is not unlimited. Coombes v. Getz, 285
U. S. 434 (1932) ; Looker v. Maynard, 179 U. S. 46 (igoo) ; Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S.
319 (7877): Consolidated Film Industries v. Johnson, 197 At. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1037); cf. Davis v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co.. 16 Del. Ch. i57, 14z At. 654 (1928).
See Stern, The Limitations of the Pou-er of a State under a Reserved Riqht to Amend
or Repeal Charters of Incorporation (igo5) 53 At. L. Rme. 1; Note (1931) 31 COT-
L. REv. 1163; Note (1937) 22 CORx. L. Q. 257; Note (i937) 23 VA. L. Rwv. 579.
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made by state amendment or by the majority or required number of share-
holders for making amendments, will impair the rights of those not consent-
ing to the change. If the impairment of contract argument were strictly
followed through, all such changes would be invalid. But a perusal of the
cases will at once indicate that this is not so. It has been held valid to alter
some but not others. It has been held that the legislature or a required
number of shareholders may amend so as to alter the objects and purposes,"
the capital stock,"7 voting rights,18 or shareholders' liability,9 but the courts
are more reluctant to sanction divestiture or change of redemption "o and
pre-emptive rights.21 The weight of authority apparently favors the power
to issue new prior preferred, ' subjugating the old preferred to an inferior
position, but there is much conflict as to the power to cancel accrued unpaid
dividends. '  The subsequent discussion will be restricted for the most part
to the power of the state or corporation by amendment to alter preferential
rights to dividends.
Although the right to accrued dividends and other preferential rights
are gained by virtue of the secondary contract, there is also implicit therein
conditions and terms giving such holders superiority over others. Hence it
might be said that there is also a contract between the various holders.
These preference rights concern dividends and.dissolution. But many cor-
porate articles arc silent as to whether prior preferred shares may be issued,
x6. Henry v. 'Markesan State Bank, 68 F. (2d) 554 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Picard
v. Hughey, 58 Ohio St. 577, 5z N. E. 133 (1898); cf. Borgman v. Bultema, 213 Mich.
684, 182 N. W. 91 (192); Colgate v. U. S. Leather Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 229, 72 At. j6
(19D9).
17. Haggard v. Lexington Utilities Co., 26o Ky. 261, 84 S. V. (2d) 84 (x935);
Whiteman v. Consolidated Gas, E. L. & Power Co., 148 Md. go, z29 Atl. 22 (925) ;
ef. Sapperstein v. Wilson, x8z At. 8 (Del. Ch. 1935). Contra: Marion Trust Co. v.
Bennett, 169 Ind. 346, 82 N. E. 782 (907) ; and s.e Johnson v. De Soto Hardwood
Flooring Co., x67 Tenn. 145, 147, 67 S. W. (2d) 143, 144 (934).
18. Heller Investment Co. v. Southern Title & Trust Co., 17 Cal. App. (2d) 202,
61 P. (2d) 807 (1936) ; cf. Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp., io6 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 3d,
1939) ; Maddock v. Vorclone Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (1929). Contra:
Lord v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U. S., 194 N. Y. 212, 87 N. E. 443 (1909).
19. Sherman v. Smith, i Black 587 (U. S. 186); Farbstein v. Pacific Oil Tool
Co., 127 Cal. App. x57, i5 P. (2d) 766 (1932). Contra: Whicher v. Delaware Mines
Corp., 52 Idaho 304, 15 P. (2d) 61o (1932) ; Garey v. St, Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497,
91 Pac. 369 (1907).
20. Sutton v. Globe ]Knitting Works, 276 Mich, 20o, 267 N. W. 815 (1936); Bres-
lay V. N. Y. & Queens Elec. Light & Power Co., 249 App. Div. x8x, 291 N. Y. Supp.
932 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N. Y. 593, 7 N. E. (2d) 708 (1937); Koeppler v.
Crocker Chair Co., 2oo Wis. 476, 228 N. W. 130 (1930). But see Clarke v. Gold Dust
Corp., io6 F. (2d) s98 (C. C. A. 3d, r939).
21. Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N, Y. S.
(2d) 415 (4th Dep't 1939), aff'd, 28o N. Y. 84o, 21 N. E. (2d) 887 (1939).
22. Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 673 (1933) ; Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., 15 A. (2d) i69
(Del. Ch. 194o); forris v. Amer. Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atd. 696
(0923) ; Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, iS N. E. (2d) 127 (1938). Contra:
Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 214 N. C. 8o6, 200 S. E. 9o6 (1939).
In New York this method is expressly allowed by statute as a means of raising
new funds. 58 Coxs. LAWS oF N. Y. A.;.;. (McKinney, 1940) § 38-9. See Matter of
Dresser, 221A pp. Div. 786. 223 N. Y. Supp. 864 (4th Dep't 927), affd, 247 N. Y. 553,
161 N. E. 179 (1928); Hinckley v. Schwarzschild & Sulzberger Co., 107 App. Div.
470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357 (ist Dep't i9o5) ; General Investment Co. v. American Hide
& Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Ati. 244 (1925).
23. Such cancellation was allowed in McQuillan v. National Cash Register Co.,
27 F. Supp. 6.39 (D. Md. 1939), aff'd, 112 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), (1939)
88 U. or PA. L. RF-. i 14; Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied. 29o U. S. 673 (1933) ; cf. Havender v. Federal United Corp.,
ii A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. r94o), 88 U. or PA. L. REv. 624. Contra: cases cited
in note 2 supra.
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whether dividends on the new stock may be paid before dividends accrued
on the old, and whether such prior preferred may at least be preferred as to
future dividends. Although the impairment of contract argument has been
abandoned concerning other incidents of shares, the courts in the past have
taken the dogged position that any forced attempt to eliminate accrued
dividends was invalid.24 This stand was forcefully adhered to in the fairly
recent case of Keller v. Wilson, 2 and the decision appeared to be the final
word in favor of the shareholder. But some courts since then, including the
one that decided the Keller case, have shown a tendency to back down from
the position there taken, although the decisions to a great extent depend on
the particular method used in eliminating the arrearages. These corporate
methods have usually been of three kinds: (i) direct or forced plan by
charter amendment, (2) merger and consolidation, and (3) indirect or
optional plan by charter amendment.
II. METHODS EMPLOYED
A. Direct or forced plan by charter amendment
In this situation the corporation, relying on the general reserve power
of the state and on a more specific statute allowing changes in the preferen-
tial and special rights of shares, presents a plan of recapitalization to its
shareholders followed by a vote. It is well settled that any change or alter-
ation which the legislature might make by its own act may be done by the
corporation or the required number of shareholders, by the state delegating
to them the power by statute to do so. "6 Or the corporation might rely on
a reservation of power incorporated in its articles. Of course the legality
of the result will depend largely on the scope 27 of the power reserved as
interpreted by the court. Normally, if a majority or the required number
vote in favor of the plan, the corporation will proceed to formally amend its
charter. The plan usually offers to the old preferred some new preferred
shares, or a combination of the same plus some cash and/or junior stock,
ii return for the surrender of the old preferred plus its accumulations. The
plan is forced because the dissenter must either sell his shares and get out
of the corporation, acquiesce in the plan, or sue to enjoin the amendment.
Besides the reduction or elimination of arrearages, one of the corpo-
rate purposes is usually to effect a resulting recapitalization surplus which
the corporation desires to have available for additional operating funds.
Another purpose may be to put an attractive class of preferred shares on
the market to encourage a capital investment, attractive because of the pref-
erence in dividends and their immediate prospect because of the surplus
and expected increased earnings. The old preferred who consent will be-
come holders of the new preferred and whatever else is exchanged, with
future rights to dividend preferences but minus their claim for arrearages.
The common will favor the plan, because their prospects of dividends, pre-
viously hopeless, are greatly enhanced if all accumulations on the old pre-
ferred are cancelled, and the dividend rate on the new preferred will be
lower than before because of the corporation's unhappy experience with
piled-up arrearages. Of course it may well be that the board of directors
24. Robert v. Roberts-Wick Co.. Y84 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 13 (i9o6); Morris v.
Amer. Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. -36, 122 Atd. 696 (1923).
25. 19o At!. i 5 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1936), (1937) 85 U. or PA. L. REV. 537, 34 Mxci!.
L. RF~v. 859, 36 Cot L. REv. 674.
26. Breslav v. N. Y. & Queens E. L. & Power Co., 249 App. Div. ixl, 29! N. Y.
Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N. Y. 593, 7 N. E. (2d) 7o8 (x937).
27. Keller v. Wilson, x9o Atl. u5 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1936).
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and managing officers are holders of large blocks of common, which is often
the case, and that their motive is to effect the plan through management
control and to line their own pockets with dividends from the expected new
earnings or the recapitalization surplus. But whether the motive is repre-
hensible or worthy, the corporate management and the common are lined
up against the preferred. The dissenters are forced to sue to enjoin the
consummation of the amendment or to enjoin the payment of dividends
on the new preferred until their arrearages are satisfied. It is infrequent
that in this situation an alternative appraisal remedy 28 exists. Hence, in
the cases which are litigated, the dissenters object on the ground that their
right to unpaid accrued dividends is a "vested" right which cannot be ini-
paired by any such amendment. The court reaction in most cases has been
to assume the answer by calling the right "vested", and then to decide that
it cannot be destroyed. For a long time this was the law in any forced
plan, and it seemed that the rule became crystallized in the important Keller
case.
Here the corporation was formed in 1925 when the statute 29 allowed
corporate amendment "changing the preferences" of shares. The plaintiff
under these circumstances secured class A shares, a type of second pre-
ferred. In 1927, the Delaware corporation laws were amended 30 to expand
the scope of corporate amendment by including "special rights" of the
shares. In 1935 the corporation by majority vote of the shareholders, and
relying on the 1927 amendment, attempted to amend its charter so as to
force a cancellation of the class A shares, and all of the dividends accrued
thereon. The class A were to get five shares of common for each share
they held plus arrearages. The board of directors declared dividends on the
new preferred and also on the common, but were silent concerning the
dividends already accrued on the old class A. Dissenting holders of this
class A filed a bill asking that the amendment be decreed void only insofar
as it purported to make the change without paying the accumulated divi-
dends and that it be decreed that the plaintiffs must be paid all accumulated
dividends before payment of any dividends to the holders of common. The
Chancellor held that under Section 26 as amended in 1927, the arrearages
could be so eliminated. The plaintiffs conceded that the right to preferences
in its future dividends may be lawfully altered by virtue of the decision in
Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 31 but contended that in the Morris
case "it was also decided that under the then existing law a corporation
could not amend its charter so as to destroy arrearages as of the amendment
date, and that such dividends had to be paid before any on the existing
junior stock. The Chancellor, however, felt that the 1927 amendment as to
Section 26 was purposely passed to obviate the consequences of the Morris
case when the statute then in effect authorized corporate amendment as to
"preferences" only, while the 1927 amendment allowed corporations to
amend, inter alia, "by changing the . . . preferences, or relative, partici-
pating, optional or other special rights of the shares" (italics supplied),
provided the requisite number of the affected shares consented.
But the Delaware Supreme Court reversed, and held that the 1927
amendment could not act retroactively so as to allow the corporation to
consummate an amendment eliminating arrearages attached to shares issued
28. The appraisal remedy, a creature of statute, rarely existed in this situation.
See note 5 supra.
29. DEL. REv. CODE (I915) c. 65, § 26. Section 82 contains the general reservation
of power to the legislature to alter, amend or repeal
30. 35 Del. Laws (1927) c. 85, § xo.
31. 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 Atl. 696 (1923), 8 .Mxxx,. L. Rrv. 617 (1924).
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in 1925, and neither could they be eliminated by virtue of the general
reserve power of the state. Even as to arrearages accrued since 1927, the
same result applies, since admitting the corporation had the power then to
cancel future dividends, it never exercised it and could not later cancel them
once accrued.3 2 The court felt that there was a limit to be reached in the
state's exercise of reserve power and that limit was reached when it at-
tempted to authorize a corporation to amend its charter to cancel accrued
dividends which were "vested" rights in the nature of a debt, and that these
could not be impaired by any subsequent statute allowing a change of
"special rights" of shares.33
Apparently the basis of the decision from a public policy standpoint is
a desire to protect the source of corporate funds by safeguarding an investor
who seeks certainty and not speculation, and who is induced to retain the
shares because of the hope of receiving income at some time. It must be
noted also that the defendant corporation at the time of amendment had a
large surplus. This factor makes the right to arrearages more tangible,
and also minimizes any real need for new capital by offering an attractive
new preferred stock.
The implication of the Keller case was that. as to corporations formed
after the 1927 amendment, accrued unpaid dividends could be cancelled,
since this amendment became part of every charter of every corporation
subsequently organized. Hence any holder on buying shares bought sub-
ject to this possibility. But the same court in Consolidated Fin Industries
v. Johnson 34 further fortified its vested right theory by holding that even
as to a corporation formed in 1928 a forced plan of conversion could not
cancel unpaid accrued dividends. Regardless of the additional power con-
ferred in the 1927 amendment to Section 26, the court felt that any divi-
dends accrued before this power was exercised 35 became vested and that
Section 26 operates only prospectively as to changing preferential rights as
to future dividends. There was also a general reserve power in the corpo-
rate charter, but this too was held not to sanction such action. In both the
Kell:r and Consolidated Filns cases, the court felt that considerations of
general welfare and public policy concerning the desirability of allowing
corporate refinancing to expand business, were not strong enough to out-
weigh individual vested rights. The corporation in the Consolidated Films
case contended that it was distinguishable from the Keller case in that the
corporation was formed subsequent to the 1927 amendment, and hence the
shareholder's right to accrued dividends was expectant or contingent. But
the court adhered to the fundamental philosophy of Pennington v. Con-
nionwealth Hotel -Construction Corporation 6 where the sanctity of the
contract right of holders of cumulative preferred shares to accrued dividends
was clearly recognized. It further averred that this is a right which the
preferred hold as against the common, a right which may well be the induc-
ing factor in the purchase of such shares, since such holders are relying on
certainty as against a speculative rise in price, and that this right has been
an inducement to retain.
It might justifiably have been held that the attributes of these shares
were defeasible. because the shareholders did contract at a time when the
32. The decision to this extent seems questionable.
33. Another ground of the decision was that this procedure was not an amendment
of a corporate charter at all under § 26, but a ". . . destruction of a right in the
nature of a debt, a matter not within the purview of the section." See the Keller case
at i25.
34. 197 Atl. 489 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1937).
35. Id. at 493.
36. 17 Del. Ch. 394, 155 Atl. 514 (1931) (a dissolution case).
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1927 amendment was in force and hence had notice that the power might
be exercised. But it was decided that in order to alter such a substantial
contract right as that to dividends on cumulative preferred shares accrued
through time, such power must be clearly and precisely expressed in the
statute.
This then seemed to be the final word in favor of the diligent share-
holder, at least in Delaware, since the court was unwilling to allow elimi-
nation even where there was ample statutory leeway. But if there is any
laches or acquiescence on the part of the dissenters by accepting dividends
on the new shares, they will be treated as holders of new shares and any
rights to arrearages will be lost.37  That accrued dividends were being
placed in a specially protected class was illustrated in Sapperstein v.
IVilson, 8 where an amendment was allowed forcing an exchange of common
for class A, a type of preferred shares, and reducing the capital formerly
represented by the class A. Also in Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co.39
an amendment was allowed eliminating the veto power of certain shares,
on the ground that this kind of right fell within the general power to amend.
The general theme of the "vested" right theory apparently continues
in full force in New York. In Strout v. Cross, Austin & Ireland Lumber
Co.,40 the directors finding it desirable to avoid income tax penalties for
1936, hut desiring to retain as much cash as possible for operating funds,
resolved to pay to the preferred shareholders a dividend for the entire
amount of arrears, a small amount to be in cash and the remainder in long
term notes of two subsidiaries. The court ruled that the corporation could
not thus legally satisfy its obligation. Although this was not a case of a
forced amendment cancelling dividends, it was a forced attempt to alter
the corporation's obligation and to alter the preferreds' rights. The lan-
guage of the court is to the effect that these rights are contractual and are
rights to cash payments, and not property.
Then in Breslav v. New York & Queens Elec. L. & P. Co.,41 though
not a dividend case, the court refused to construe § 36 (G) of the Stock
Corporation Law 42 in such a way as to sanction a charter amendment
reclassifying plaintiff's non-callable preferred shares so as to make them
callable, saying ". . . assuming the authority to make the proposed
change is implicit in the statute, we believe its exercise would contravene
the provision of the Federal Constitution". After pointing out that the
Queen's Company was incorporated and the preferred shares issued prior
to the statute relied on by the corporation. the court intimates that the
statute cannot act retroactively, and that apart from this, it is also not
within the scope of the general reserved power of the state, which was in
existence when the corporation was formed, to divest this right. As to the
nature and character of the right involved, the court says . . . it is a
vested property right inherent in her ownership. by virtue of which she
37. Frank v. Wilson, 9 A. (2d) 82 (Del. Ch. 1939) ; Romer v. Porcelain Products,
2 A. (2d) 75 (Del. Ch. 1938); Trounstine v. Remington Rand, i94 Atl. 95 (Del. Ch.
1937) ; McQuillan v. Nat. Cash Register Co., -7 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939), affd,
T2 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 4th, 194o), (1939) 88 U. oF PA. L. REv. 114; cf. Havender
v. Federal United Corp., xi A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 194o), 88 U. OF PA. L. REV.624.
38. i82 Atl. 18 (Del. Ch. 1935).
39. 14 A. (2d) 380 (Del. Sup. Ct. 194o).
40. 283 N. Y. 4o6, 29 N. E. (2d) 669 (194o). The leading New York case sub-
scribing to the vested rights theory is Roberts v. Roberts-Wick Co., 184 N. Y. 257,-77
N. E. 13 (go6).
41. 249 App. Div. i81, 291 N. Y. Supp. 932 (2d Dep't 1936), aff'd, 273 N. Y. 593,
7 N. E. (2d) 708 (1937).
42. s8 Coxs. LAWs N. Y. AN;. (McKinney, i94o) § 36-G.
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received a fixed right in the division of the profits and earnings of the
Queen's Company 'so long as it exists, and of its effects when it is dis-
solved.'" The corporation's purpose was to be able to call in enough
shares to obtain the required percentage for a merger.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina also has followed the rule of
the Keller case by holding, in Patterson v. Durham Hosiery Mills,4" that
the right to unpaid accumulated dividends was a vested property right of
the plaintiff shareholders, of which they may not be divested without due
process of law. Note that this apparently was not even a forced plan, but
one where the old preferred could keep their shares, subordinated as to
dividends to the new prior preferred.
But there has been some indication that some courts do not feel bound
by the feeling of reverence which has usually been shown 'towards accrued
dividends. In McQuillan v. Nat'l Cash Register Co.," a federal court in
Maryland allowed a forced amendment issuing new shares and eliminating
accrued dividends on the old preferred. And in Harr v. Pioneer Mechan-
ical Corp.,45 the Second Circuit Court, in upholding an amendment creating
new prior preferred, also held that the Delaware statute involved in the
Keller case specifically included arrearages among the rights which could
be changed by amendment. An additional trend away from the vested
rights theory can be found in Ohio 46 and Virginia,' 7 where statutes spe-
cifically permit amendments providing for the elimination of accrued divi-
dends. In Ohio, the dissenter in such a case is given relief by way of
appraisal. It is interesting to note the comment appended to the Ohio
statutory provision: "In principle there is no distinction between changes
of rights to dividends accrued in the past and changes operative in the
future."
The case of Vulcan Corporation v. Westheinier & Co.,4s was decided
under the Ohio statute 4" as it stood before the 1939 amendment 50 which
43. 214 N. C. 8o6, 2oo S. E. 9o6 (1939). In Pennsylvania, although there is ap-
parently no case involving a forced plan, there is some indication that the "vested
rights" theory would be adhered to. See Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh
United Corp., 334 Pa. 107, 117, 5 A. (2d) 89o (1939), where it was said that rights
acquired by virtue of preferred stock are vested. And it was. further stated in Levin
v. Pittsburgh United Corp., 330 Pa. 457, 470, ig Atl. 332 (5938), that neither the
failure of earnings in any particular year nor the absence of a declaration of such divi-
dends in years when there are earnings, will prevent them from accruing, and they are"owing" to the holder.
44. 27 F. Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1939), aff'd, 112 F. (2d) 877 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940),
(1939) 88 U. OF PA. L. REv. 14. The statute was construed broadly so as to allow
the amendment. A lower court case in Pennsylvania tends to the same result, though
an alternative ground of the decision was ratification. Harvey v. National Drug Co.,
30 D. & C. 358 (Pa. 1937).
45. 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), cert. denied, z9 U. S. 673 (1933).
46. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, i94o) § 8623-14, I5. Elimination
is allowed by the forced or optional plan, with an appraisal remedy for dissenters in
each in § 8623-72.
47. VA. CODE ANN. (Cum. Supp. 5940) § 3780. A go% vote of shares affected is
required to amend the charter to eliminate arrearages, but they may be cancelled thus
only where "such dividends have either not have been earned or have not been declared
because of a deficit in the capital of the corporation. .
48. 27 Ohio Law Abstract 694 (Ohio App. 4th, 5938), appcal dismissed, 135 Ohio
St. 536 (1939). The plan required the dissenter to surrender 44 shares of 6%l preferred
stock, with arrearages of $37 per share, for 44 shares of a 4y2% cumulative preferred
plus 22 shares of a 3% convertible preferred, together with $I per share in cash.
49. General Corporation Act of 1927, 112 Ohio Laws 14, 15, OHIo GENERAL CODE
(1927) § 8623-54, I5.
50. OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's Baldwin, 1940) § 8623-14, z5. This sec-
tion as amended in 15 (3) now permits the amendment of the charter of an Ohio Com-
pany by two-thirds vote of shares affected, so as to provide for the discharge (without
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expressly provided for elimination of accrued dividends. This was a forced
plan requiring the dissenter to surrender his old preferred and accumula-
tions for new stock. The corporation was formed and the stock issued
after 1927. The dissenter asked that he be decreed to have a vested right
in the accrued dividends of his stock. But this was refused because the
General Corporation Act of 1927 allowed amendments to corporate char-
ters, when adopted by a majority of shares affected, changing preferred
shares to new shares and altering the "terms and provisions of any class of
shares"P 1 The court felt that in this situation the dissenter has an adequate
appraisal remedy, which is exclusive in the absence of fraud or illegality;
and it was adjudged that the rights of the dissenter are the same as the
rights of those who assented to the plan. Evidently the court here inter-
preted "terms and provisions" to include accrued dividends.
As to a corporation formed and preferred stock issued before 1927, it
was held in Harbinc v. Dayton Mallcable Iron Co." that the corporation
by charter amendment could force an exchange of new preferred for old
preferred and that the 1927 Act could, in effect, act retroactively because it
was an exercise of the reserved power of the state to alter and amend, which
of course was in existence before the corporation was formed. But the
court refused to allow the Act to operate to eliminate dividends accrued on
the stock, because it was unable to find that the Act made "any provision
for .taking care of cumulative dividends"."s Accordingly it enjoined the
payment of further dividends on new common until arrearages on the old
preferred were fully paid. In view of the earlier decided Vulcan case where
a forced elimination of arrearages was allowed under the 1927 Act, this
reasoning seems questionable. Apparently this decision led to the 1939
amendment where it is expressly stated that charters may be amended so
as to provide for "the discharge, adjustment or elimination of rights to
accrued undeclared cumulative dividends" 5, on any class- of stock, subject
to the rights of dissenters to appraisal.
But it is an open question whether this amendment will be effective in
allowing a charter amendment affecting the accrued dividends of stock
issued before 1927. If the reasoning of the Harbine case is followed, the
reserved power may be invoked to aid this amendment in so acting, and this
result would seem to agree with the intent of the legislators,55 although it
may be open to objection on constitutional grounds.58  It is submitted that
payment), adjustment or elimination of "rights to accrued undeclared cumulative divi-
dends . . ." on any class of stock, § 8623-14 (2), subject to the rights of dissenting
stockholders to appraisal in § 8623-14 (3). But appraisal is not available where the
above provisions are in the corporate articles. The appraisal value of the stock must
take into consideration the accrued dividends. See the Vulcan case at 696.
Si. See note 49 supra, § 8623-IS (3) (c).
52. 61 Ohio App. i, 22 N. E. (2d) 281 (1939).
53. Id. at 286.
r4. See note 5o supra.
55. The comment appended to § 8623-14 as amended states that "In principle there
is no distinction between changes of rights to dividends accrued in the past and changes
operative in the future."
56. In Williams v. National Pump Corp., 46 Ohio App. 427, 188 N. E. 756 (1933),
a charter amendment changing preferred to common stock was upheld, and it was
further decided that the 1927 Act was constitutional as authorized by the reserve power.
But here the original stock issued after the Act, as in the Vulcan case, where the appeal
was dismissed on the ground that no debatable constitutional question was involved.
135 Ohio St. 136 (1939). These cases are no authority for the proposition that the
1927 Act and the 1939 amendment, may act retroactively, in effect, as to accrued dvi-
dends, although in the Harbine case, the court did decide that the 1927 Act could ope-
rate thus by aid of the reserved power in allowing a forced change of shares. The
court in the Harbine case at 286 discussed the fact that in the Williams case the stock
was issued after the 1927 Act and that in the case before it the stock was issued prior,
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such a result would be desirable, and could be justified on the ground that
stock issued before 1927 is subject to the general reserve power of the state,
and hence this stock and dividends accrued came into being subject to the
exercise of that power which was exercised in 1927 and 1939. The Califor-
nia case of Heller Investment Co. v. Southern Title & Trust Co."' held valid
an amendment authorizing a new issue which was given the majority of
voting rights oyer the common, which the plaintiff held. The amendment
was held to be authorized by the reserved power, but it must also be noted
that a new capital structure was necessary to sustain the defendant corpora-
tion as a going concern.
It seems evident from the foregoing decisions which are breaking
away from the vested right theory and the passage of statutes of the same
tenor, that the trend is toward allowing corporations to refinance when the
plan is fair and equitable, when there is an honest purpose for expansion,
or when it is necessary to save the sinking corporate ship. So it seems that
more inroads may be expected on the vested right theory by the previously
and universally condemned method of the forced plan by charter amendment.
B. Merger
Merger is another method which has been utilized in eliminating
arrearages. It is somewhat analogous to the forced plan by direct amend-
ment in that the shareholder has no choice of retaining his shares plus
their dividends. Such a plan involves the exchanging of new securities for
the preferred stock and the accumulations.58 However, the alternative
remedy of appraisal is available in the merger situation. But this has been
criticized as inadequate, 9 and the same opportunity for not giving proper
recognition to arrearages is present here as in the direct amendment method.
The recapitalization feature may be either the sole 8 0 purpose of a formal
merger, or it may be incidental to a genuine merger. In the former case
apparently the vested rights theory should operate in full force and the
merger should be enjoined since it is a mere attempt to do by merger what
has been prohibited by direct cancellation.6' In the latter case, the only
consideration should be that the plan is fair,62 since there must be some dis-
but said "We do not think this difference in facts in the two cases will alter this prin-
ciple." The Vulcan case no doubt is authority for the proposition that dividends accrued
on stock issued after i927 may be eliminated, since that result was there reached even
in the absence of the 1939 amendment.
57. 17 Cal. App. (2d) 202, 61 P. (2d) 807 (1936).
5& For examples, see United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F. (2d) 923 (C.
C. A. 6th, 1935) ; Havender v. Federal United Corp., ii A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct.
194o). Cf. Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 72, 67 Atl. 657 (x9o7),
reversed, 75 N. J. Eq. 229, 72 AtI. 126, (io) ; Windhurst v. Central Leather Co, iox
N. J. Eq. 543, 138 AtI. 772 (1927), aff'd, 107 N. 3. Eq. 528. 153 Atl. 4o2 (i931) ; Prall
v. United States Leather Co., 6 N. 3. Misc. 967, 143 AtI. 382 (1928), affd, 1o5 N. J. L.646, 146 Ati. 9i6 (1929).
The classic example of this device is the repeated recapialization of what is now
the United States Leather Corporation. See DEWING, CORP~AE PROMOTIONS AND
REORGANIZATIONS (1914) i6. The plan which involves the scaling down of accumula-
tions is discussed in Cravath, Reorganiations of Corporations in SomE LEGAL PHASES
oF CORPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATION, AND REGULATION (1917).
59. See note 9 supra.
6o. See DEWING, op. cit. supra note 58.
61. In Havender v. Federal United Corp., ii A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1940)
(merger allowing elimination of accrued dividends), the Chancellor in the lower court,
2 A. (2d) I43 (Del. Ch. 1938), recognized this possibility and refused to allow the
Keller case to be so easily circumvented. Cf. Colgate v. United States Leather Co., 75
N. J. Eq. 229, 72 Atl. 126 (xgo9).
6.The plan was held to be fair in United Milk Products Corp. v. Lovell, 75 F.
(2d) 923 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935). and in facFarlane v. North American Cement Corp.,
NOTES
tribution of new securities due to the nature of the transaction. Another
solution was made in Petry v. Harwood Electric Co.,6S on the theory that
the merger effected a dissolution and the preferred holder could specifically
enforce his contract entitling him to a preference of par value plus accumu-
lations upon dissolution. In general, this result has not been followed,"
since any sizable group of dissenters could thus prevent an effective merger.
In view of the attitude of the court in the Keller and Consolidated
Films cases, the decision in Havender v. Federal United Corp."5 came as
a distinct surprise. The vested rights theory is apparently circumvented
by means of the device of merging with a wholly owned subsidiary. Here
the plaintiff moved to enjoin the merger between defendant, a Delaware
corporation of which he was a preferred shareholder, and its wholly owned
subsidiary. The merger agreement provided for an exchange of the 61
preferred shares of the defendant corporation, upon which dividends of
$29 per share had accrued, for preferred and common shares of the new
corporation. The plaintiff's only alternative was to have his shares and
dividends appraised as provided by statute. But he claims that a share-
holder's right to arrearages could not be eliminated by either of these means,
but only by full payment in cash. The merger was otherwise fair and
equitable. The Chancellor felt that such a procedure was no more than an
unauthorized attempt at recapitalization of the defendant corporation, in-
effective to extinguish accumulated dividends on the preferred stock of the
dissenters, within the rule of the Keller66 case. But the Supreme Court
of Delaware declined to extend the rule or the reason thereof to the merger
situation. The court pointed out that the merger statute was in existence
when the corporation was formed and the stock issued and this provision
had existed in the Delaware corporation laws from their inception, that
it is elementary that these provisions are written into every corporate char-
ter, and that the holder has notice of the possibility of merger. In the words
of the court, "The average intelligent mind must be held to know that divi-
dends may accumulate on preferred stock, and that in the event of a merger
of the corporation issuing the stock with another corporation, the various
rights of shareholders, including the right to dividends on preference stock
accrued but unpaid, may, and perhaps must, be the subject of reconcilement
and adjustment; for, in many cases, it would be impracticable to effect a
merger if the rights attached to the shares could not be dealt with." 7 The
Keller case was distinguished, the court stating that there the shareholders'
rights were proposed to be altered by a method not within the contempla-
tion of the law as it stood when the corporation was formed and the stock
issued, and with no alternative right to demand and receive the value of
16 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396 (1928) ; but unfair in American Malt Corp. v. Board of
Public Utility Commissioners, 86 N. J. L. 668, 92 At. 362 (914). Laches is usually
an alternative ground where relief is denied. Havender v. Federal United Corp, ii A.
(2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. i94o) ; Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 'oi N. J. Eq. 543,
138 Atl. 772 (r927). In the MacFarlane case it was also considered important that the
merged corporation, of which the dissenter was a preferred shareholder, had not been
earning any dividends out of which surplus could be paid, while the other corpoiation
was paying dividends. And in the lWindhurst case the court stressed the fact that there
was an existing deficit of $2o,oooooo and that the plan was probably necessary to save
the corporation.
63. 280 Pa. i42, 124 AtL 302 (1924). See also Simms, An Application of the
Doctrine that Consolidation Effects Dissolution (1929) 15 VA. L REV. 757.
64. Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., 107 N. J. Eq. 528, 153 At. 4o2 ('931); cf.
Levin v. Pittsburgh United Corp., 33o Pa. 457, 466, 467, 199 AtL 332 (1938) (sale ofall the assets).65. ii A. (2d) 331 (Del. Sup. Ct. i94o), 88 U. or PA. L. REv. 624.
66. See note 6r stpra.
67. See the Havender case at 338.
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his stock in money. But might it not be said that the "average intelligent
mind" should also be held to know that a corporation because of a long
period of business depression, may find it necessary to recapitalize and elim-
inate arrearages in order to continue to operate as a going concern, and that
this was a condition to the purchase of the stock because of the reserved
power?
It was also pointed out in the Havender case that the state has an inter-
est in the corporate structures 68 erected under its authority, and having
provided for mergers, they are not regarded with disfavor. But the state
had also, by reason of its reserved power, provided thaf special rights of
shares could be changed and to this extent some changes were contemplated,
and yet in the Consolidated Films case the elimination of accrued dividends
was not allowed because this power was not exercised. True it is that
here the dissenters by complying with the statutory requirements could
have had their shares appraised, but this remedy, as pointed out previously,
has been frequently regarded as inadequate. But in the Havender case,
this remedy is held to be exclusive in the merger situation. Undoubtedly,
this decision has dealt the vested right attribute of accumulated dividends
a serious blow. And it should be kept in mind that'the basis of the Keller
decision, a desire to protect the source of corporate funds as a matter of
public policy by safeguarding the investor who seeks certainty and not
speculation, and who, relying upon the receipt of income at some time, is
induced to retain the preferred stock, was ignored 69 by the court in the
Havender case. However, the result reached seems presently desirable,
since the safeguard remains that the plan must still be fair and equitable.
If not, the court should look through the transaction to prevent fraud even
though it is carried out in strict compliance with statutory requirements.'0
Another case upholding a merger altering a shareholder's rights is
Clarke v. Gold Dust Corp.,7 1 involving New Jersey corporations. The
plaintiff shareholder of Y corporation attempted to upset a merger already
consummated with X corporation. Y had amended its charter, so that its
objects and purposes would be similar to those of X, and shortly thereafter
the merger was effected. Because of the forced conversion of shares of
Y into those of X, plaintiff lost voting and pre-emption rights; there was
also some change in future dividend rights. The court admitted that the
right to vote was a property right, but anticipated its decision by reasoning
that this has lost importance since Y has already been absorbed and hence
the plaintiff can no longer vote as to Y's affairs. In the same way, the pre-
emptive right is disposed of. The real reasons for the decision seem to be
that the merger had already been in effect for two years and hence the
plaintiff was guilty of laches; that the test of whether or not a court of
equity will grant relief as sought here is the fairness of the plan to stock-
holders; and that in balancing equities and conveniences, weight must be
given to the fact that suit was brought by the holder of a very few shires of
a large issue.
If the plan is otherwise fair' and equitable, it is a safe prediction to
state that accumulated dividends may be eliminated by the merger method.
Such a result seems justifiable where there has been n6 surplus or earnings
over a period of years out of which the accrued dividends could have been
paid, and the constummation of the merger is necessary to save the corpora-
tic)n from going out of business. In this situation, the dissenters should be
68. Ibid.
69. See (io4o) 88 U. oF PA. L. R-v. 624.
70. Small v. Sullivan. 24; N. Y. .343 157 N. E. i6 (1927).
7i. Io6 F. (2d) 598 t C. C. A. 3d, 1939).
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left to appraisal, since it seems that their interest in being paid arrearages
in full is out of proportion to the wishes of the majority and to the loss in
going-concern value which would otherwise occur.
C. Indirect or Optional Plan by Charter Amendmcnt
Although the courts have been loath to permit destruction of accumula-
tions by the forced or direct method of charter amendment, they have al-
lowed a defcrmcnt of such dividends by the method of creating new prior
preferred. This method is to be distinguished from the -forced plan by
charter amendment and merger, since here the shareholder has the option
of keeping his old stock. Courts sanctioning this method have reasoned
that the contract right involved is the old preferred holders' right to receive
dividends before the common, and that statutes allowing changes in pref-
erential and special rights of shares are broad enough to include this
method. Not only are future dividend preferences of the old preferred
made inferior to the prior preferred, but also those already accumulated.
Hence if these arrearages may be set back to this extent, their quality as
vested rights has certainly been impaired.
Such a plan by charter amendment has been upheld in Delaware, in
Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp.7 2 The plan involved an optional
surrender of one old preferred and its arrearages for one prior preferred
and three common. There was also a recapitalization giving rise to a sur-
plus. If the old preferred kept their stock, they were relegated to second
place in dividend participation as to not only future but also accumulated
dividends, although they remained prior to the common. The plaintiff was
willing to concede that his future preferential rights could be subordinated,
but attempted to enjoin dividend payments on the new prior preferred on
the theory that they would impair his vested rights in past accumulations.
But the bill was dismissed, on the ground that since the defendant was
formed in 1926 the plaintiff contracted subject to this possibility under § 26,
which then allowed changes in preferential rights, and that the old pre-
ferred are still prior to the common and hence no contract rights have been
violated. The court stated that these rights are preserved, but deferred. It
should be noted that here the corporation, before the plan was adopted, had.
a consolidated deficit of over $3,ooo,ooo, and this factor was probably of
practical importance in the court's decision. The language of the court, as
in the Havender case, further indicates a swing away from the vested rights
theory. "Nevertheless, these cases by no means hold that language such
as that of the charter of this defendant should be construed to express or
imply an undertaking that accumulated dividends will in fact, and at all
events, be paid; nor an undertaking that the corporation will not make
changes, permitted by the statutes, in its capital structure, which may as a
consequence reduce the probabilities of actual payment of the dividends." 73
The same result was reached in Ohio in Johnson v. Lamprecht,7' the
court stressing that the old preferred holders' right to receive dividends be-
fore the common was preserved. An additional factor in favor of.the cor-
poration was that the dissenter could have had the benefit of an appraisal
remedy, provided by statute for such cas6s. When the case was in the
intermediate appellate court, the court said, "It is our conclusion that* the
preferred stockholders have no such vested interest in the present earned
profits of the company. The company may use its present earned profits
72. i5 A, (2d) 169 (Del. Ch. 194o).
73. Id. at 173.
74,. 33 Ohio St. 567, i5 N. E. (2d) 127 (1938).
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in the furtherance of its business within the honest discretion of its
directors." ,5
In New York the optional plan apparently is common as a means of
reorganization, being allowed by statute 76 which also provides an appraisal
remedy for the dissenters. Here again the new preferred is prior not only
to future dividends on the old preferred but also to those already accrued.""
The use of this device aparently resulted from the decision in Hinckley v.
Schwa rzschild & Sulzberger Co., 7 where it was held to be within the
reserved power of the state to pass a statute authorizing the issuance of
preferred stock by a two-thirds vote, although the law in effect when the
corporation was organized and when the dissenter's stock was obtained
required a unanimous vote. From this decision to 1923 there was no pro-
tection 79 whatever given to the objectors in such a case, but now the remedy
of appraisal is available where a stockholder's "preferential rights" are
altered.'0
But strangely enough, where new preferred prior in dividends and dis-
solution has been superimposed on existing preferred, the New York courts
have held that there is no alteration of preferential rights and the dissenters
cannot resort to appraisal. 8' Hence they are totally unprbtected in this
situation although this result has not gone uncriticized. 2 The reason must
be that this method of reorganization is favored in New York, for in Mat-
ter of Silberkraus 81 it was said that "The statute was not intended to
hamper a corporation in obtaining additional capital through the issue of
new securities with superior preferential rights." 84 This harsh position
was receded from somewhat in In re Kinney 88 where appraisal was allowed,
not merely because of the issuance of new prior preferred, but because the
plan also involved a capital reduction -which resulted in a surplus. The
court felt that losing the benefit of the earning power of such capital and
alsc the protection afforded by it in liquidation or dissolution, constituted
"a material alteration of the preferential rights of the old preferred for it
has reduced materially and finally the amount of stated capital which there-
tofore had 'safeguarded the preferential rights of the old preferred stock." 86
It seems regrettable that appraisal is refused where new prior preferred
issues even where there is an absence of divergence of capital into surplus;
the dissenters are left in a precarious position, forced to either remain in
the corporation or to sell their stock on the market, presumptively an inade-
quate alternative because the new preferred shares will have a depressing
effect on the price of the old. Such a result, especially in view of the plain
wording of the statute, leans too much in the corporate direction, and it
75. 26 Ohio Law Abstract 392, 394 (Ohio App. 1937).
76. 58 CoNs. Laws oF N. Y. ANN. (McKinney, 194o) § 36-E.
77. Matter of Dresser, 221 App. Div. 786, 223 N. Y. Supp. 864 (4th Dep't 1927),
aff'd, 47 N. Y. 553, 161 N. E. 179 (1928); In re Duer, 27o N. Y. 343, I N. E. (2d)
457 (936).
78. 1o7 App. Div. 470, 95 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1st Dep't 19o5).
79. See memorandum dissenting opinion in Matter of Dresser, 247 N. Y. 553, 556,
x61 N. E. 179 (x928).
go. 58 CONS. LAWs N. Y. ANN. (McKinney, 1940) § 38-9. Matter of Silberkraus,
25o N. Y. 242, 165 N. E. 279 (i929) ; cf. Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics,
280 N. Y. 840, 21 N. E. (2d) 887 (1939).
81. Matter of Dresser, 221 App. Div. 786, 223 N. Y. Supp. (4th Dep't 1927), aff'd,
247 N. Y. 553, i61 N. F_ 179 (1928).
82. Id., dissenting opinion at 556.
83. 25o N. Y. 242, i65 N. E. 279 (1929).
84. Id. at 247, 281.
85. 279 N. Y. 423, x8 N. E. (2d) 645 (z939).
86. ld. at 431, 649.
NOTES
seems that the Ohio statute 87 is more equitable in allowing appraisal in-
this case.
And in Pennsylvania, where the statute in the Business Corporation
Act of 1933 88 is similar to Section 26 as amended 89 in Delaware, it would
seem that the result reached in the Shanik case could be legally attained,9 0
at least as to corporations formed after 1933. And the courts there will
probably call on the reserve power to aid the Act in affecting corporations
formed before 1933, especially in view of the lower court decision in Harvey
v. National Drug Co.," where a forced plan changing the rights to arrear-
ages was held constitutional as to a corporation formed before 1933.
The indirect method, however, has not been approved everywhere,
especially as to the deferment of dividends already accrued. In New Jersey,
where the vested rights theory is well established 92 outside of the merger
cases, this practice was disapproved very recently in Buckley v. Cuban
American Sugar Co.95 by the Vice-Chancellor, where restraint was granted
pefiding a final hearing. The plan proposed that the old preferred sur-
render their shares plus arrearages of $54.50 per share for new preferred,
redeemable or convertible into common at the corporation's option. A
$16,ooo,ooo surplus existed and the dissenters contended that the board of
directors held large blocks of common stock, and that it was their design to
get rid of the preferred stock arrearages with as little cash as possible so
that the common would thereby profit to a greater extent. The court felt
that although it could sanction an amendment providing for a new issue of
preferred stock to have priority as to future 9, dividends over the existing
preferred, it could not alter the right of preferred stockholders to accrued
unpaid dividends. And in North Carolina in Patterson v. Durham Hosiery
Mills," the vested rights theory was resorted to in denying a similar amend-
ment attempting to relegate already accrued dividends to a position inferior
87. See note 5 supra. Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 15 N. F. (2d) 127
(1938).
88. PA. STAT. AxN. (Purdon, 1938) tit. x5, §2852-80t (4), 804.
89. See note 30 supra.
go. In the recent case of Johnson v. Fuller (E. D. Pa. 194i), Phila. Leg. Int., Jan.
30, 1941, p. r, col. 5, the federal district court upheld a plan which relegated the old
preferred who refused to give up their shares plus dividends accrued thereon in ex-
change for some new prior preferred, common, and a debenture, to a position inferior
in dividends to such new prior preferred. The court found that the plan was voluntary
in fact and not compulsory, and that it was fair and equitable; but also observed that
dividends on the old preferred could not be deferred to the common. But although the
corporation was formed before 1933, it must be noted that a corporate resolution
amending the charter was adopted in ig5. The old preferred was then issued, subject
to a proviso n this amendment that the company would not, while any of this issue
was outstanding, create any obligation entitled to priority in payment nor create any
other issue of stock which would in any way impair the rights of such shareholders,
unless two-thirds of the old preferred consented. Seventy-two per cent. voted in favor
of the plan, so it appears that the dissenters contracted subject to this possibility and
cannot complain. Apparently because of this resolution, the effect of the 1933 Business
Corporations Act was not discussed. But even in the absence of such resolution the
same result might have been reached under the Act, because of the decision in the
Harvey case where not an optional, but a forced plan was involved. See note 44 supra.
91. 30 D. & C. 318 (Pa. 1937).
92. Lonsdale Securities Corp. v. International Mercantile Marine Corp., rox N. J.
Eq. 554, x39 At. 50 (Clh. 1927). See Johnson v. Lamprecht, 133 Ohio St. 567, 572, 573,
i5 N. E. (2d) 127, 129, 130 (1938).
93. N. J. Chancery Ct., 294o.
94. In this respect, the court followed General Investment Company v. American
Ride & Leather Co., 98 N. J. Eq. 326, 129 Ati. 244 (1925), where a new issue of prior
preferred was held permissible provided it did not affect the rights of preferred stock-
holders to accrued unpaid dividends.
95. 2r4 N. C. 8W6, 200 S. E. 9o6 (z939).
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to new prior preferred, but an additional reason was that the court felt that
the plan in effect was compulsory and not voluntary."
III. CoNc.usIoN
The present law on the elimination or deferment of accrued dividends
apparently is in a state of metamorphosis. Whereas in previous years,
neither was ever allowed because of the vested rights theory, recent cases
show a distinct trend in the opposite direction. The status may be briefly
summarized as follows:
I. Direct cancellation-this method lacks juridical sanction in most
instances, but may be upheld where recapitalization is necessary to
continue the corporation as a going concern, where the plan is fair
and equitable, and where there is a broad general reserve power in
the statute. If there is an appraisal remedy in this situation, which
is infrequent, this is an additional factor for the success of the plan.
The absence of surplus during the years in which the dividends
accrued may be an important factor with some courts.? In Ohio
and Virginia, direct elimination is allowed by statute. New York,
New Jersey, and North Carolina seem to disfavor this method,
while Delaware's position is somewhat uncertain after the results
and broad language in the Havender and Shanik cases. In any
event, it is imperative that the shareholder be diligent, or laches
will bar him if the amendment has already taken effect.
2. Merger-since the Havender and Clarke cases, this method may
leap into importance as a device for scaling down arrearages. There
is more chance for success 11 by merger than by direct amendment,
since in the case of merger, there will always be an appraisal remedy.
The factors of an urgent and worthy need for recapitalization and
laches on the part of the dissenters are of practical importance in
upholding the plan if it is otherwise fair and equitable.
3. Indirect Cancellation-this method is countenanced more than any
other, because technically the accumulated dividends are not de-
stroyed, merely deferred. Future dividends on the old preferred
may usually be subordinated, and in most jurisdictions it appears
96. In Kreicher v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N. E. (2d) 5oz (1940), 8 U.
OF CHI. L. REV. x34, there is an indication that as to corporations formed before the
Illinois Business Corporations Act of 1933, a charter amendment authorizing a volun-
tary plan requires unanimions consent of the shareholders affected, unless there was a"provision in the charter allowing such an amendment by less than all the shares before
or at the time such shares were issued. The Act of 1933, which expressly allows the
deferment of existing preferred to new prior preferred, evidently applies only to cor-
porations formed or stock issued after 1933. But this is only a dictum, and it is pos-
sible that an opposite result might be reached when the issue is squarely raised by
using the reserved power to aid the 1933 Act.
In this case, the plan was upheld because of a charter amendment in 1928, adopted
before the old preferred in question were issued, which authorized an issue of new prior
preferred by a two-thirds vote of the outstanding preferred shares. In this respect, the
case and holding are similar to Johnson v. Fuller (E. D. Pa. i94i), Phila. Leg. Int.,
Jan. 30, 1941, p. x, col. 5.
97. Harr v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933), ccrt.
denied, 29o U. S. 673 (x933).
98. This is evidently true in New Jersey, where a consolidation or merger was per-
mitted which forced the preferred- holders to waive their rights to accrued and unpaid
dividends. Windhurst v. Central Leather Co., o5 N. J. Eq. 621, 149 At. 36 (1930).
The Clarke case, which also allowed the elimination of certain rights by merger,
although decided by a federal court, also involved New Jersey corporations and statutes.
See also, MacFarlane v. North American Cement Corp., i6 Del. Ch. 172, 157 Atl. 396
(x928).
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that .his device will succeed unless* the purpose of the plan is
obviously to injure the old preferred to the benefit of the common,
or unless the court feels that the plan is only superficially voluntary
and in fact compulsory. In determining this, the probability or
negligibility of future earnings being sufficient to cover dividend
requirements on both the new and the old preferred shares is impor-
tant; but no definite standard as to the proof required seems to have
been established. The existence of an appraisal remedy is a factor
in favor of the success of the plan, and fairness is essential.
In view of the present need for corporate refinancing in many in-
stances 21 and keeping in mind that the certainty of investments must Also
be protected,100 the following suggestions to a practical solution are sub-
mitted:
(i) Stdtutes should be passed or existing statutes construed 101 to
permit elimination of accrued dividends by charter amendment-and
merger or consolidation, and pernitting deferment of accrued divi-
dends by charter amendment.
(2) Dissenters should be provided with an appraisal remedy, which-
ever plan is used, and this remedy should be exclusive except in
cases of fraud or illegality.
(3) The number of shareholders of the affected classes necessary to
adopt such an amendment, should be at least a two-third majority
in each class.
(4) But only dividends accrued in years when there was no surplus
of the kind available for dividends, or where there was a capital
deficit, should be allowed to be eliminated or deferred as above.102,
(5) As to the years when such a surplus existed but there was no dec-
laration of dividends, such arrearages should maintain a preferred
position whether the plan is forced or optional, and dissenters
should be paid in full.
(6) In the case of merger or consolidation, whether or not there was a
surplus available for dividends in each year, should be considered
in the appraisement of the arrearages.
(7) These statutes should be allowed to affect corporations formed,
stock issued, and dividends accrued thereon, after the particular
state reserved the general power to alter, amend, or repeal. This
99. Much of this need is due to the fact that many corporations were formed when
business conditions were good. Unwisely they provided for too high a return, from
7 to io per cent., on the preferred stock, although they probably expected that earnings
would be large enough to meet this charge. When depressions set in, the earnings in
most cases were grossly inadequate to satisfy current dividends, and hence the present
arrearages.
zoo. However, many dissenters acquire their stock long after the plan of reor-
ganization is made public, and enter the contest for speculative reasons only. "All reor-
ganization proceedings are impeded by the horde of gamblers who stand ready to buy,
on a speculative basis, almost any security of doubtful value and then to clamor loudly
for the abstract justice of their rights." See DEWING, CORPORATE PROMOTIONS AND
REORGANIZATIONS (914) 47.
IoI. Many corporate laws now in effect permit charter amendments changing the
special or relative rights" of the shares. This phrase conceivably could be construed
as including dividend arrearages, although such a construction would no doubt invite a
constitutional challenge under the "impairment of contracts" clause.
102. It is not asking too much of a preferred holder that he give up claims to divi-
dends, which could never have been declared and which at the time of proposed reor-
ganization probably cannot be paid in full, in return for the continued existence of the
corporation of which he is a part.
808 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
result could be legally justified on the theory that this reservation
operated to make the stock and all rights incident thereto, includ-
ing dividends which later accrued, contingent on the exercise of
that power. Under such a theory, there should be no objection to
the statutes thus operating, since their passage merely makes
specific what was before general.
(8) Whichever method is used, the plan should be fair and equitable
as regards the relative rights of the shareholders affected.
In most cases where arrearages are extremely large, it is usually be-
cause of a long period of depression in which there was no surplus out of
which dividends could have been declared. The above type of statute or
interpretation seems to be the fairest solution when reorganization is neces-
sary. If surplus has been earned in most of the years, then there would
seem to be less need for a reorganization, but if the corporation is in bad
straits and there is no existing surplus in spite of previous earnings due to
mismanagement or other reasons, then this type of reorganization should be
refused .20  In cases where there has been an earned surplus in any given
year, the accrued dividends for that year are at least more tangible in
nature, more of a "vested right", than where no fund ever existed for their
payment and the dividends accumulated merely through the passage of time.
In the latter event, where there is need for operating funds, the corporate
necessity for continued existence should overshadow the claims of minority
holders to full payment of arrearages.
I. M. S.
Notice and Hearing in Class Suits in Administrative Proceedings
The phenomenal growth of administrative law during the past half-
century 1 springs, fundamentally, "from the inadequacy of a simple tripartite
form of government to deal with modem problems." 2 Increased govern-
ment control over more and more phases of our economic life necessitated
the creation of myriad government agencies with large discretionary pow-
ers.8 The cumbersomeness of the legislative process, the unhurried plod-
ding of the judicial process were unable to cope with complex social and
economic questions, 4 whose solutions were the more difficult to determine
because of the constant fluctuations of a sensitive economy. Especially
where a controlling principle was to remain constant, but its application to
specific fact situations had to be continually readjusted because of rapid
changes in economic factors, the administrative process was assigned the
task. Railroad rates may be instanced as an example. 5 Obviously, effici-
ency from a procedural point of view--expeditious handling of these prob-
lems-was essential. The need for prompt administrative action continued
to become more acute,6 and the drive for speed was on.7
103. In such a case the courts should have a wide discretion, and if there is any
reorganization, it should be attempted under the Chandler Act.
1. Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. REv. 2ox and authorities there cited.
2. LANDIS, THE ADmImsTRATivE PRocFss (1938) 1.
3. Id. at x6; Note (1938) 87 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 208.
4. Hankins, The Necessity for Administrathve Notice and Hearing (1940) 25 IowA
L REV. 457, and also at 462 n. 23.
5. SHARP-.AN, THE INTRSTATE CoMMERCE CoMMIssIoN (1931) c. I, § 4.
6. Hankins, supra note 4, at 462.
7. Cf. LAN-DIS, op. cit. mnpra note 2, at x4.
NOTES
Opposed to such untrammelled "efficiency" on the part of administra-
tive procedure 1 was the judicial tradition ' of adequate notice 20 and a fair
hearing I' for any party to a controversy, in order that he might be allowed
to present his side of the case and rebut the opposition. With the aid of the
"due process" clause the judiciary was able to impose its will, even in the
face of contrary statutory provisions, 12 and graft its view into the very
nature of the administrative process.13 But this clash of drives could not
result in a totally one-sided decision, and judges, not oblivious to the exi-
gencies of the times,14 were willing to compromise in many situations."5
The argument for administrative convenience was particularly cogent
in cases where large groups of people were directly involved and the sheer
impracticability," if not impossibility,27 of a hearing for all was self-evident.
Thus, "the number of persons regulated" became an important factor 8 in
determining whether or not notice was a requisite of "due process" in a
given administrative proceeding. Courts 19 and writers, 20 obeying an all or
none law, often considered the problem as one of notice to all or notice to
none.21  An appreciation of the purposes of a hearing,22 it is submitted,
might well redefine the problem as one to be considered primarily from a
quantum point of view.
The impracticability of hearing all the members of a given class should
neither deny the administrative body the assistance of whatever evidence a
duly qualified representative of that class might be able to lay before it, nor
should it allow the membership of the class to be deprived of what other-
wise would have been the constitutional privilege of having its side of the
case fairly presented. To make use of Justice Holmes' famous statement,
8. Note (i931) 8o U. OF PA. L. RErv. 96, 97: "Notice and hearing, however, detract
to some extent from administrative efficiency. They involve delay and expense."
9. Hankins, supra note 4, 457, 458. "It is a rule founded on the first principles of
natural justice older than written constitutions. . . ." Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y.
283, 9o (1878). In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418,
457, the question was stated as whether the hearing was had "by due process of law,
under the forms, and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of successive ages
for the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in controversy."
io. See Notes (293 r) 8o U. OF PA. L. Rrcv. 96, (1934) 34 Co. L REv. 332.
rr. See Note (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 87&
x2. Note (193) 8o U. OF PA. L. REv. 96, M..
r3. The question being made one of federal constitutional right it brought state
administrative bodies under the regulation of the federal courts.
14. "The effectiveness of this argument of administrative convenience may perhaps
be traced to the fact that most judges have at one time or another sat on a court whose
backlog of undisposed cases was something to worry about." Hankins, supra note 4,
at 465 n. 34.
zs. Id. at 462.
x6. Instance the case of the Bituminous Coal Commission, which bad to rent ball
rooms for hearings affecting only a single territory. Id. at 482.
27. "If each and every shareholder . .. had a right to insist upon a notice . ..
it would be simply impossible to fix annually a valuation on shares of capital." Clark
Distilling Co. v. Cumberland, 95 Md. 468, 474, 52 Atl. 661, 663 (1902), quoted in Corry
v. Baltimore, x96 U. S. 466, 478 (2905).
zS. Hankins, mipra note 4, at 463.
ig. Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 500, 215 Pac. 257 (1923), discussed page 814 infra.
2o. Cf Hankins, supra note 4 passim.
21. " . . we assume that . . . neither the plaintiff, nor the assessor of Den-
ver, . . . nor any representative of the city and county, was given an opportunity
to be heard. . . . The question, then, is whether all individuals have a constitutional
right to be heard before a matter can be decided in which all are equally con-
cerned, . . ." Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colo-
rado, 239 U. S. 44"1, 444, 445 (1915).
22. A hearing may restrict opportunities for oppression or graft where the authori-
ties are dishonest; its record may give evidence of incompetence on appeal; or it may
give the authorities a filler knowledge of the facts and interests involved. Note (x93z)
8o U. OF PA. L REv. 96, 97.
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that "there must be a limit to individual argument in such matters, if gov-
ernment is to go on," 23 does not necessarily imply that the limit should be
set at zero.
The extent to which the number of persons regulated removes the ne-
cessity for notice and hearing, the extent to which notice to representatives
of large groups may satisfy the "due process" requirement, or may be desir-
able quite aside from constitutional requirements, 24 and the basic factors
which should be determinative of these problems constitute the subject of
this inquiry.
THE TRUE CLAss SUIT
Early *in the development of the administrative process statutes began
to reflect the obvious proposition that the intricacies of common law pro-
cedure, or of the as-yet unemancipated, "grave-ruled" 25 reforms, had no
place in a system where efficiency was more important than the maintenance
of impractical technicalities for the sake of professional "art". So it was
that while at law unincorporated associations had no standing as "legal enti-
ties", the Interstate Commerce Act provided specifically that suit might be
brought in administrative proceedings by any firm, association, "mercantile,
agricultural or manufacturing society, or any other organization." 26
The effect of the provision was not only to make permissible repre-
sentative suits for a class, but to make practical authoritative presentation
before the administrative body of the needs and circumstances of a large,
widely scattered group with a common interest and a common problem. 27
Then, too, where the discrimination complained of more particularly affected
the class as a whole rather than any individual directly, as in the case of a
rate ruling which discriminated against a city or locality 28 to the detriment
of inhabitants who are neither shippers nor carriers, the real party in inter-
est and the real point at issue are more efficiently brought before the board.
Recognition of the class suit has not, however, been limited either to
cases specifically recognized by statute, or to situations in which the class
was the party plaintiff. In Chamnber of Comnmerce v. Fedcral Trade Com-
mission 29 only thirteen of a total of 59o members of the Chamber of Com-
merce were served and made defendants by the commission, which subse-
quently issued an order affecting the entire membership. The Circuit Court
of Appeals, in rejecting a contention that "due process" had been lacking,
held that where a common or general interest existed among such numbers
of individuals as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the ad-
ministrative tribunal, one or more might sue or defend for the whole. While
specifically refusing to apply the equity rule permitting class suits, because
23. Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorado, 239
U. S. 44!, 445 (1915).
24. See Note (ig3i) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 96, 98, differentiating between adequacy
of notice as a constitutional question and as a question of proper administrative pro-
cedure, desirable for reasons of policy.
25. Reference is had to Maitland's famous remark, "The forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from their graves." EQuITY AND TIE FORMS OF AcrioK
(19o9) 296.
26. INTERsTATE CoMmERcE AcT, § 13a, 4! STAT. 484 (1920), 49 U. S. C. A. § 13 (i)
(1929).
27. In Cattle Raisers' Ass'n v. Fort WVorth & D. C. Ry., 7 1. C. C. 513 0i898),
complainant represented owners and producers of live stock from Texas, New Mexico
Indian Territory, and Kansas.
28. In United States v. Merchants' & Manufacturers' Traffic Ass'n of Sacramento,
242 U. S. 178 (igi6) complaint was against higher rates to Sacramento than to San
Francisco. In denying the relief requested, Justice Brandeis pointed out that under
§ x3a the I. C. C. could be petitioned for a hearing. The act there provides that "any
body politic or municipal organization" may so petition.
29. 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
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the original proceedings were administrative, the court pointed out theanalogy between the situations and concluded that where procedure againsta class is proper in judicial proceedings, a fortiori it should be upheld in less
formal hearings.8 0
Against the objection that in this manner some members of unincor-porated associations "may not be truly represented by the persons to whomnotice is given," 81 it has been argued that "the convenience of the judicialprocess permits this short-cut to be taken; the demands of the administra-
tive process seem to be at least as compelling." 82 It should be pointed out,however, first that mere membership in a given organization may not al-ways give rise to such a community of interest as to bind the absent party,.where in fact his interests are opposed to those of the person purportedlyrepresefiting him.88 Thus the courts require that sufficient members be
served "to represent all the diverse interests." " Secondly, it is submittedthat the greater flexibility and informality of the administrative proceeding,
may well place it in a position to avoid defects present in the judicial proc-
ess.3
Courts have looked upon the problem of notice in administrative pro-ceedings as one whose solution must be "practical, and neither technical northeoretical." 36 Informal notice, by mail, by publication, or by posting inappropriate places, as is done when an injunction is issued against a largeclass of persons, have all been looked upon favorably. For this reason, whileit may well satisfy "due process" to bind all members of an unincorporated
association by notice to the duly constituted officers,57 it would clearly seemmore desirable to require informal notice to the entire class, preferably bythe normal medium for reaching the entire membership, such as publicationin an association newspaper, or in a form letter to the membership, either
by the representatives themselves or by the board. 8 The practicability ofsuch a procedure is enhanced as a result of the fact that appearance andparticipation at an administrative hearing by one in fact not otherwise prop-erly represented, 8 will prevent subsequent complaint of lack of formal no-tice.40 Thus speedy determination of the issues and their ramifications isfacilitated and action on the merits made more conclusive and more just.
3o. The case is particularly significant in view of the statutory provision that find-ings of fact by a Federal Trade Commission having any evidence to support it is con-clusive and binding on the courts. The constitutionality of the provision was upheldin Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Ass'n v. F. T. C., 18 F. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. 8th, x927).For a general discussion of the class suit under the new Federal Rules of CivilProcedure see 2 MOORE AND FRIEDMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) § 23.01 and for adiscussion of the judgment as rcs judicata against all members of the class, § 23.o7.
31. GELLHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS (940) 493.
32. Ibid.
33. Id. at 5o8 with reference to the practice of the S. E. C. requiring proof by pur-ported representatives of groups of investors.
34. National Harness Manufacturers' Ass'n v. F. T. C., 268 Fed. 705 (C. C. A.6th, 292o), citing Evenson v. Spaulding, 15o Fed. 517 (C. C. A. 9th, 2907), where thecorresponding equity rule is discussed.35. Dean Pound has said that the administrative process is today to the modemjudicial process as was equity to the common law of Lord Coke's time. Hankins, ripra
note 4. n. I.
36. Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F. (2d) 768, 770 (C. C. A. 5th, z937).
37. Ibid.
38. Compare the practice of the S.E.C. in requiring declarants in proceedingsunder the Public Utility Holding Company Act to notify all security holders. GE.L-
HORN, op. cit. mpra note 31, at 493.
39. Labor unions may well be in this class where there has been a dispute aboutthe appropriate unit for collective bargaining. For discussion of a trend toward re-garding labor unions as legal entities see Note (1938) 38 COL. I. REV. 454.40. Stephenson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R., i8o Miss. 147, 168, I77 So. 5M9 5t5(1938), stressing the administrative nature of the proceedings.
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DETERMINATION OF RATES AND STANDARDS
It has been held that administrative bodies empowered to set tninimum
wage scales, 4' and railroad rates, 4 2 are required to give notice and hearing
in order to satisfy "due process". Nor will the courts refrain from thor-
oughly examining the nature of the hearing conducted to determine whether
it consisted of an open forum discussion of irrelevant generalities, or
whether it was a fact-finding session 43 at which evidence was introduced
and recorded; and which in general was so conducted as to be both of assist-
ance to the board in arriving at its conclusion, and of benefit to the various
interests involved by allowing them the opportunity of substantiating their
respective arguments with objective proof.
That the courts so zealously guard the right to notice and hearing in
these cases, despite the large number of persons involved on every side of
each controversy, has been pointed out as an instance in which the im-
portance and far-reaching effect of the regulation has been balanced against
mere administrative convenience, and has resulted in a decision in favor of
the former.44 However, a careful examination of the cases in this field may
cause one to question seriously to what extent courts have sacrificed admin-
istrative convenience. It should be recognized that despite the large num-
ber of individuals involved, the number of conflicting interests is in reality
small, and representation of the many by the few makes notice and hearing
both feasible and desirable. Furthermore, in evaluating what is adminis-
tratively convenient it should also be remembered that efficient treatment
and expeditious treatment are not necessarily synonymous. The fact situa-
tions which must be studied in setting any standard designed to change
intricate relationships for a period of time are many. Conceding that the
members of the administrative boards are qualified experts, it would still
seem that a proper decision might be facilitated by the parties themselves
sifting and presenting the mass of pertinent detail. This should prove at
least as helpful to the technical experts as attorneys' briefs are admitted to
be in a court of law.
It should be emphasized, however, that even where courts have made
notice a requisite of rate regulation, and have been strict in their require-
ment that the hearing be judicial in nature, yet they have been lenient when
the p-oblem before them concerned the question of the quantum of notice,the
hearing of how many. Thus, in the New England Divisions case," where
the problem was one of dividing the shipping charge among a number of
41. McGrew v. Industrial Commissioner of Utah, 96 Utah 203, 85 P. (2d) 6o8
(1938).
42. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (189o). The
case is discussed in Hankins, sipra note 4. at 473, particularly in n. 5o, 51. Cf. State
Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., zi8 N. J. Eq. 5o4, i79 At!. 1x6 (x935).
Whether the law is as definite on this point as some writers have declared it to be may
be doubted, but this doubt will not affect the general problem under consideration.
It is to be hoped that progressive opinions will remove the last vestige of recogni-
tion from the traditional verbal costuming in which-courts have dressed many of their
decisions. "Legislative" and "executive" versus "judicial" administrative actions as
criteria for the necessity of notice beconie signposts without direction when applied to
a specific set of facts in this type of situation.
In general, on the use of categories in the law see Cook, "Substance" and "Pro-
cedure" in the Conflict of Law's (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 333. For a criticism of the
obfuscation created by indiscriminate use of these terms see Hankins, supra note 4, at
474; Note (1934) 34 COL L. REv. 332.
43. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Commission of Minnesota, 24 F.
Supp. 370 (D. Minn. 1938).
44. Hankins. supra note 4, at 468, 474.
45. 261 U. S. x84 (923).
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connecting carr'ers, the Supreme Court rejected the contention of the appel-
lants that each individual carrier was entitled to notice and hearing, and
treated the problem as one of presumption and method of proof. Pointing
out that the number of carriers might far exceed 6oo, and the number of
rates involved, many millions, the court held it constitutional for the com-
mission to assume the evidence typical in character and ample in quantity. '
Despite language in the "cavalier style" 47 to the effect that all are
entitled to notice and hearing in the regulation of wage and hour legislation
it would seem that there, too, representative evidence would satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement, as well as the somewhat higher standard of desir-
able administrative procedure.
The probleni of setting standards of quality for imports represents
somewhat of an exception to the general rule, it having been held', that
there need be neither notice nor hearing for anyone in the establishing of
such regulations. Courts, in refusing to invoke the "due process" clause,
speak of there having been no "taking of property".49 There was merely
a determination of whether the right to import existed, whicli right Con-
gress intended to be determined, not judicially, but by an appointed govern-
ment agent. The argument would seem to be a result of the early view that
Congress had plenary power over all imports5 0 and consequently could
regulate them in any manner it saw fit without regard for individual
"rights", for, in effect, these were non-existent except as Congress saw fit
to grant or deny them.
Important as is the distinction from the constitutional point of view,
the legislative trend toward approving fuller hearings as a matter of policy
in administrative law makes the question one of less practical current sig-
nificance. 1 Indicative of this trend in an analogous field is the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938.12 While requiring public hearings,
and "appropriate notice" of them by the secretary, the provisions of the
Act make no attempt to define what shall be considered appropriate. It is
submitted that the omission is desirable, especially in view of the large num-
ber of varying circumstances covered by the Act, and the difficulty of estab-
lishing a single norm applicable to all. The Act also provides that "any in-
terested person may be heard in person or by his representative." Is The
recognition of representation may be expected here, too, to encourage the
efficiency which class action facilitates.
HORIZONTAL RAISE IN TAX ASSESSMENTS
The classic illustration of the importance of the number of persons reg-
ulated as a factor in determining whether hearing and notice is a requisite
46. It is interesting to note the report of this case below, 66 I. C. C. 196 (i92),
which indicated that subsequent adjustments might well be needed, but that the urgency
of relief required as compared with the great length of time involved in making a final
and complete determination warranted the action taken. It is to be noted further that
although the door was left open for any petition for a change in a particular case, the
commission specifically refused to allow anyone subjected to the payment of what might
later turn out to have been unreasonable charges, an award of reparation.
47. Hankins, supra note 4, at 474.
48. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904).
49. Id. at 477.
So. Note (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 96, m04.
Si. Congress has provided an elaborate system of appeal tunder which the But Ifield
case would have been decided otherwise on the question of hearing by the customs
examiner. 52 STAT. 1084 (1938), i9 U. S. C. A. § ixoz (Supp. 1940).
52. 52 STAT. 1055 (1938), 21 U. S. C. A. §37x (e) (Supp. 294o).
53. Ibid.
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of "due process" is the administration of tax laws.5' On the one hand,
where an individual's assessment (or a special assessment which has to be
made for each property holder individually) is under consideration notice
and hearing is required. 5 On the other hand, however, it is claimed that
where the problem is one of raising the valuations on all property within a
given district in like proportion, notice has been held unnecessary."
It is earnestly submitted that a critical analysis of the authorities cited
in support of this proposition fails to substantiate it unequivocally. The
problem appears again to be one of the quantumn of notice required, what
kind of notice and to how many, rather than an alternative between notice
to all or notice to none. True, a Wyoming court has expressed in classic
form the "all or none law" by stating, "Where a rule of conduct applies to
more than a few people, it is impracticable to give every one affected a voice
in its adoption, and it is doubtful that any opportunity for a hearing is nec-
essary to be given in such a case," 57 but a cursory glance over the cases dis-
cussed above indicates the inaccuracy of that statement as a general proposi-
tion. The court itself was not satisfied to rely on it and proceeded to decide
the case, which involved a horizontal raise in tax assessments, on the basis
of what appears to be a more desirable analysis, namely, that the oppor-
tunity for a hearing need only be a reasonable one, that "what is reasonable
depends on the nature of the case," and that on the particular facts pre-
sented for decision there had been reasonable notice.
Similarly in Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. Colorado,"' in which Justice
Holmes laconically commented about the "limit to individual argument",'
although the decision is permeated with the idea of administrative conven-
ience, yet the facts of the case indicate that there had been notice by stat-
utory provision for the time of the meeting of the board, which notice has
been held sufficient in tax cases; 60 and it is important to observe that the
opinion carefully makes a point of indicating these facts clearly. Finally,
it has already been pointed out that the language used, referring as it does
to limits, indicates the possibility of a middle course.
In favor of no notice at all in this type of case only two arguments have
been advanced. The one looks to the ability of "a large number of ag-
grieved persons to affect future legislative or administrative policy." e, It
merits little discussion for its weakness is admitted by its proponent, who
readily recognizes that even a large number of persons should "not be rele-
gated to seeking later legislative modifications if their efforts can only
result in locking the barn after the horse is stolen." e2 The second argu-
ment stresses the fact that where a large number of people are affected "the
temptation, if any, to commit injustice is reduced to a minimum . . . the
people must trust someone, and rely to some extent upon the inherent hon-
esty of men." 63 This assumes, first, that the moral code of officials is such
as to prevent discrimination between tax districts. Whether this be a war-
5.4 Hankins, supra note 4. at 464.
55. Londoner v. City of Denver, 210 U. S. 373 (19o8).
56. Hankins. supra note 4, at 465, citing Baker v. Paxton, 29 Wyo. 5oo, 215 Pac.
257 (1923) and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Colorkdo,
239 U. S. 441 (1915).
57. Baker v. Paxton, 29 ,Vyo. 5oo, 544. 215 Pac. 257, 272 (1923). Italics added.
;8. 239 U. S. 441 (1915).
59. Referred to page 81o supra.
6o. Kentucky R. R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 32! (r885) ; State R. R. Tax Cases, 92
U. S. 575 (1876).
6I. Hankins, supra note 4, at 467.
62. INd.
63. Baker v. Paxton, 29 NVyo. 500, 539, 215 Pac. 257, 270 (1923).
NOTES
ranted assumpt on 61 in the 'face of the many possible ramifications of such
discrimination, need not here be considered in view of the second necessary
assumption, which is that the sole purpose of notice is to avoid dishonesty.
It is not surprising, therefore, to observe that there are statutes pro-
viding for notice to a given number of taxpayers within a tax district whose.
assessments are being horizontally raised in order to effect an equalization.
Here the principles of the true class suit are applied, and the courts do not
hesitate to validate the statute 6 despite the fact that "notice" is not given
by statutory provision for the time of the board's meeting. It would ap-
pear desirable that such notice should not be given to individuals chosen at
random, the entire group of which may not be sufficiently apprised of the
problems involved, but rather to municipal authorities, officers of civic or
business associations, or any other parties who might be truly said to rep-
resent the class whose rights are being adjudicated. This seems to be the
practice in Nebraska, where the county clerk, the chairman of the county
board, and the county assessor are all given notice of proposed equalization
hearings.06
An analogous result, equally desirable, was reached in the case of eval-
uation of shares of stock for purposes of taxation. 7 The sole notice given
was to the corporation, but the court in approving the procedure empha-
sized the fact that the hearing was accorded the corporation as a representa-
tive of the individual stockholders, and consequently sufficient as to them.
Thus. it is submitted, in this situation, too, it is possible to preserve the
advantages of notice and hearing without sacrificing the efficiency of the
administrative process by means of the class suit.
UNREPRESENTED CLASSES
Statutes empowering the banking commissioner to approve reorganiza-
tion plans for insolvent banks, when such are submitted by a specified ma-
jority of the depositors, have been consistently upheld even where no notice
or hearing on the merits of the proposed reorganization is provided for the
dissenting minority.68 There can be little doubt that from a constitutional
point of view the result is amply justified, for, as is pointed out, the right of
an unrepresented, objecting depositor is unprejudiced, and he may bring
an appropriate action in the courts to protect his interests.69 From a prac-
tical point of view, it is quite possible that the requirement of a large per-
centage 10 of assenting depositors obviates, to a great extent, the necessity
of a hearing as an informative device. It is felt, however, that where there
are dissenters it is more advisable to provide an adequate hearing before
allowing the plan to be effected. and by binding the objectors, to limit the
scope of the judicial review. The practical objections to notice in such
64. The facts of the case require the assumption of a woeful inefficiency on the
part of the board in order to negative doubts as to dishonesty. One might point out
further that the raise was on the basis of the class of land as well as on the basis of the
district, and this procedure was also upheld. Certain affirmative relief on the merits
was indicated as available in another suit.
65. People v. Orvis, 30! Ill. 350, 133 N. E. 787 (1922).
66. Boyd County v. State Board of Equalization, 26 N. W. 15z (Neb. x94i).
67. Cory v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466 (i9o5).
68. Milner v. Gibson, 249 Ky. 594, 6i S. W. (2d) 273 (1933); Hoff v. First State
Bank of Watson, 174 Minn. 36, 218 N. W. 238 (1928) - Farmers' and Merchants' Bank
v. Tomlinson, 55 S. D. i85. 225 N. W. 305 (1929). Note (934) 34 Cot- L REv. 332
seems not to have distinguished between notice of the insolvency and notice of a hear-
ing on the proposed reorganization.
69. "It is in the nature of an administrative order, and is not conclusive against
nonassenting creditors." Hoff v. First State Bank of Watson, i74 Minn. 36, 44, 218
N. W. 238, 24r 0928).
7o. Seventy-five per cent. is a common provision.
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cases are minimal. All members of the class are known, as are their where-
abouts, and letters sent to the last known address of all not petitioning for
the reorganization would be both adequate and convenient." Furthermore,
the safeguard provided by the original assent of the great majority of the
depositors would make judicial review even less necessary than it might
otherwise be. The relative saving on expense of litigation, the greater final-
ity of the administrative decree in a large scale commercial matter, and the
discouraging of non-consent by depositors who hope thereby subsequently
to attempt to gain a verdict from a sympathetic jury while at no time run-
ning any risk of losing whatever advantages the other depositors have se-
cured, would all seem to militate in favor of a conclusive decision by the
banking commissioner.
An analogous problem has arisen under the National Labor Relations
Act with regard to rights under contracts made by an employer, where the
employer has been ordered by the board to cease and desist from enforcing
the contract and from fulfilling his obligations under it, and the other party
to the contract has neither been served nor notified of the administrative
proceeding.72 Here again, although the courts have determined the consti-
tutional question on the grounds that the rights of the other party to the
contract have not been adjudicated nor prejudiced in any way, 3 it has been
suggested 74 that provision for class representation of the affected labor
union 75 or group of employees is the most desirable solution.
CONCLUSION
It would appear unfortunate that the problem of notice and hearing in
administrative proceedings affecting large groups of individuals should
have been considered by eminent authorities as a question of notice to all,
or notice to none. It is submitted that more frequent application of the
principles of representative suits obviates the necessity of so doing, and
makes possible the retaining of the benefits of hearing and the traditional
concept of judicial procedure, without sacrificing, substantially, administra-
tive convenience. In effecting such a policy it would appear that the great-
est latitude should be given each individual agency in determining the par-
ticular technicalities of its own procedure.7' Informality of notice, in
particular, may well make possible increased efficiency and should therefore
be encouraged.
With the administrative process in its developmental stage it is espe-
cially important not only that an attempt be made to cure it of its own evils,
but that it be kept especially free from those defects of the older and less
flexible governmental processes which are charting the course of its develop-
ment.
A.L.L.
71. Compare the rule in reference to a hearing on a trustee's report as discussed.
Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Tomlinson, 55 S. D. 185, 225 N. W. 3o5 (1929).
72. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB. 3o9 U. S. 350 (1940), 40 COL. L. REv. 898;
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 3o5 U. S. 197 (938); NLRB v. Greyhound Lines,
303 U. S. 26! (1938). See Note (1940) 25 IOwA L. REv. 622, 633, n. 54.
While the problem is not peculiar to class suits, it assumes especial importance
from a practical point of view, where a large group such as the members of a labor
union would have to be made parties to the action.
73. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U. S. 350, 362 (94o).
74. (1940) 40 COL_ L. Rev. 898, 9o2
75. See note 39 mspra.
76. The Committee of Administrative Procedure, appointed by the Attorney Gen-
eral in 1939, in a progress report was skeptical "that a single formula, or set of formu-
lae, can properly control the various and changing situations in which administrative
action is present." (i94o) 8 U. S. L WEEK 237.
